This paper will argue against such an understanding of the role of national ceremonies. While it will not be denied that ceremonies can exercise potentially transformative power, this paper will demonstrate that all national ceremonies have to be observed as performances rather than rituals, characterized by the specific relationship between their performers and audiences. The transformative power of these performances will only be felt if the audience perceives the performance as authentic, which this analysis will understand as a quality of experience. This will be F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 3 set against other attempts to objectify the notion of the authentic -so visible in all nationalist ideologies. The paper will conclude that even when a performance succeeds in creating a community of shared experience, that community dissolves with the end of the performance.
National Ceremonies
The author most responsible for viewing national ceremonies as vehicles for national identity is George L. Mosse. The emergence, function, and structure of national ceremonies are most thoroughly examined in his book The Nationalisation of the Masses (1975) . In essence, Mosse adopts a Durkheimian approach in which national ceremonies are seen as social facts and can therefore be explained as providers for the objectification of the general will (1975: 2). These ceremonies were part and parcel of the 'new politics' of secular religion whereby the people worshipped themselves.
Based on the idea of popular sovereignty, they transformed, according to Mosse, 'the chaotic crowd of the "people" into a mass movement' which 'shared a belief in popular unity through a national mystique' (ibid.). Political action now became a 'drama supposedly shared by the people themselves' (ibid., emphasis added). The developed discourse of secular religion is the main framework through which Mosse analyses the role of national ceremonies and public festivals, which are seen as rituals that are structured by a specific liturgy and that convey a clearly defined cult to the faceless masses. They are enacted on sacred sites and surrounded by sacred symbols that apparently objectify national myths. Indeed, phrased like this, national ceremonies cannot but be seen as vehicles of secular religion. These carefully structured ceremonies and festivals have a specific function. Mosse traces their origin to Rousseau's recommendations to the Polish government, where he suggests that the Three main structural elements of these rituals are emphasised in Mosse's framework:
the producers of the ceremony, the form of the so-called liturgy, and the recipient masses. Mosse spends considerable space in his book describing the producers, mainly the cultural and political elite acting as individuals and organisations. He carefully describes the form of the liturgy and explains how a cultural background conditions the elite's choices in their creative work. The masses are mainly described as participants that take an active role in enacting the liturgy -from the dress they wear to the banners they carry and the songs they sing. The fact that these masses actively participate in the rite is seen as necessary and sufficient evidence of their being 'imbued' with the virtues of patriotism. Thus defined, national rituals have been adopted by many theories of nationalism that stress the importance of such ceremonies in the shaping of national identities or national collective memory.
Different perceptions of the roles and functions of national rituals distinguish some of the dominant approaches to the process of nation-formation. Those that emphasise the creative role of the producers we see as constructivist, and those that emphasise the constraining effect of cultural background as ethno-symbolist. Yet in both approaches the emphasis is on the interaction between, in Mosse's words, the producers of the rite and the liturgy they create. For Mosse, the fact that the masses are now excluded (again put in the passive form!) from active participation in these 'rituals' presents a serious problem from a Durkheimian viewpoint. This perspective is nicely summarised by Paul Connerton, who claims that 'to enact a rite is always, in some sense, to assent to its meaning ' (1989: 44) . Mosse, as we have seen, clearly subscribes to this view. One of its 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Liturgies can therefore be performed in a language that the participating masses do not even understand. This conclusion originates from Mosse's, and not only Mosse's, treatment of the public. They can be excluded, but are rarely seen as agents that exclude themselves from such ceremonies. They are reactive objects rather than reflexive agents.
When Mosse discusses the establishment's attempt to imbue the values of 'bourgeois pleasantness', he touches, in my view, on one of the most crucial aspects of the role of national ceremonies in the process of nation-formation. Unfortunately, due probably to his focus on the German case study and his Durkhemian approach, he fails to give it the attention it deserves. Mosse overlooks the fact that:
1. there is an obvious distinction between the active participants in a festival/ceremony and the spectators.
2. the 'masses' are capable of critically assessing the 'liturgy' and its meanings, a process that includes reflecting on their own experiences.
3. the 'masses' are capable of identifying and interpreting the intentions of the producers of these festivals and ceremonies in their own individual ways and based on their own biographical memories.
4. only pre-modern, simple, and small communities may have achieved the level of homogeneity in sharing both the meanings of performed 'liturgy' and the interpretations of the producers' intentions. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Rituals and Performances
In the quote above, Alexander implies that rituals and performances are distinctive phenomena, where in historical progression one is replaced by another. Yet a brief overview of the main literature of performance studies indicates that Alexander adopts a rather narrow view of performances. For Richard Schechner (1988) , one of the leading theorists of performances, ritual -beside play, games, sports, and theatre/dance/music -is just one genre of performance. For Schechner, these two concepts do not stand in a direct opposition. All rituals are performances, but not all performances are rituals. All performances share certain basic qualities: (1) they are enacted in a special ordering time, (2) they all attach a special value to objects imbued with values, (3) they are all non-productive in terms of goods -'standing quite consciously outside "ordinary" life' (Huizinga, quoted in Schechner, 1988: 11) ; and (4) all of them are framed within a certain set of rules, conventions or traditions (Schechner, 1988: 10-13 ).
1 For more about the main theories of rituals and performances, see Marvin (1996) , Schechner (1988 and 2002 ), Turner (1969 and 1982 . Schechner's emphasis on the function of a performance as the crucial factor in defining its genre poses a considerable problem for any analysis since, following this logic, genres can only be established ex post facto. If a performance achieves a transformation of participants' status or identity, we can call it ritual. If a performance manages to entertain, but not to transform, it is closer to theatre. Unless the function of a performance is determined by the intentions of the producers, I argue that defining the genre of performances in such a way wrongly assumes that performances would have the same impact on all those present at the performance. In the age of complex, reflexive societies, the effects of a performance are not so clearly identifiable. Performers do not necessarily define their performance. Rather, we must look to those for whom the performance is enacted.
Contrasting efficacy/ritual with entertainment/theatre, Schechner points to their crucial differences regarding interactions between those who stage a performance and Following these arguments, it is important to emphasize that the routinization of a performance does not make it a ritual, though it may be a ritual-like performance.
Literature on nations and nationalism tends to uncritically adopt the term ritual for all performances officially or unofficially defined as national. Indeed, labelling a performance as a ritual saves us from a painstaking examination of the audience's Alexander declares the performance to be a success. For him, audiences of a successful performance will identify with actors, and cultural scripts will achieve verisimilitude through effective mise-en-scène. In similar manner, Fisher-Lichte (2005: 54) claims that 'it is the atmosphere which binds performers and spectators together', where 'the performance is carried out as a mutual resonance between the rhythm of the actors and spectators'. Only successful performances might be seen by some as 'ritual-like' events, where they achieve cultural extension to the audience and the audience psychologically identifies with the performance. In Alexander's words, the performance is then re-fused. A performance fails when this re-linking is incomplete, the elements of performance remain apart, and social action seems artificial by failing to persuade. Such a performance is de-fused. 'Performances in complex societies seek to overcome fragmentation by creating flow and achieving authenticity. They try to recover a momentary experience of ritual, to 
Authentic Nations
In everyday life, the term authenticity is attached to material things as much as it is to one's self; to individuals as to collectives; to specific social interactions as to whole cultures. In their attempts to explain the notion, authors mirror it with other expressions: "autonomy", "sincerity", "individuality," "self-development," "selfrealization", "self-possession", but also with phrases such as "your own thing", "true self", "real me", "owning myself", or something that is "genuine", "original", "trustworthy", "legitimate", "unaltered". Marshall Berman, in his Politics of Authenticity (1971: xiii) , notices how 'our vocabulary overflows with expressions which express a persistent and intense concern with being oneself'.
Regardless of the definition to which we adhere, there is practically no person who would not be able to apply the notion of authenticity to some object, person, culture or Reading these works, it is difficult to find a term with a more controversial existence; so accepted in everyday social and private lives, yet so contested and controversial in the meta-life of ideas. The literature on authenticity that I could access, and indeed digest, can be organised according to the ways in which their authors examine issues of personal authenticity or the authenticity of social groups, their cultures and cultural objects. While personal authenticity is mainly examined in existentialist and antiexistentialist literature, disciplines such as cultural studies and studies of art, folklore and tourism opt to examine the authenticity of cultures and cultural objects. At first, it (Golomb, 1995: 19) , culturalists see it as a 'thing' that can be studied using objective research methods. Yet, despite their differences, both groups are engaged in the search for authenticity, one insisting that it can be found only within ourselves, the other looking for it in the objective, 'really real' world.
Most existentialist writers insist that there is no objective definition of authenticity, since each individual has to find his/her own self. They try to convince us that the main question is not 'what' a true expression of authenticity is, but 'how' one reaches that authenticity. In their works, existentialists set usually fictional examples of heroes and anti-heroes in extreme situations, though these are not given as prescriptions.
There are innumerable ways in which we can construct our true selves in a situation where no inner or outer criteria for validity exist, and each one of us is supposed to , 1997, 20) .
Nationalism and the concept of authenticity lead intertwined lives. Even authors who manage to identify some forms of nations in the pre-modern world would see nationalism, be it an ideology or a political movement, as a modern phenomenon. The emergence of nationalism is usually framed within a story of a rapidly changing structural world -of industrialisation, migration from rural to urban centres, capitalist economy, even population density -and/or the dramatic implications of a newly emerging revolution within the world of ideas -from the omnipotent notion of reason and progress, through the death of god, to the triumvirate of brotherhood, equality and liberty that were firmly placed on the shoulders of popular sovereignty. Within these worlds the ideology of nationalism emerges as a schizophrenic Janus -pulled between the nostalgia for the past and a longing for a better future, but directed and produced by the present.
Almost all of the aforementioned authors claim a similar birthdate for authenticity, though, depending on the author, its fathers vary. It emerged in the transitional period between the breakdown of simpler traditional societies and the emergence of complex ones. For Charles Taylor, this period is marked by 'the massive subjective turn of modern culture' which demands that we follow 'a voice of nature within us' (ibid.: Taylor (1991: 25) authenticity is 'a child of the Romantic period, which was critical of disengaged rationality and of human atomism that didn't recognize the ties of community'. Here, the issue of authenticity is mainly seen as an issue of morality. At the time of the death of god, as Nietzsche called it, an inner voice was sought that would tell us how to act morally.
26-7). A crucial turn in articulating the notion of authenticity comes with the writings of Rousseau and Herder. According to Trilling 'From Rousseau we learned that what
As Taylor puts it: 'Being in touch with our moral feelings would matter here, as a means to the end of acting rightly ' (1991: 26) .
According to Taylor, Herder's main influence was his idea that 'each one of us has an original way of being human', or as Herder put it -has his or her own 'measure'
(1991: 28). Herder was mainly concerned with the origin of language, which he found in the 'inventive nature of human beings' (Bendix 1996: 36) . Revolting against the humanity at large to get in touch with authenticity ' (1996: 17) . Already with the German Romantics, the notion of an authentic life became the leading social value. It is this emerging value system that conditions individual actions achievable through a painful engagement in self-reflection as much as through the creation of a nonconstraining, non-alienating social world. Berman calls it the 'politics of authenticity', projecting 'a dream of an ideal community in which individuality will not be subsumed and sacrificed, but fully developed and expressed ' (1975, vii) . He finds it in the politics of the German Romantics and as a 'point of departure for both liberal and socialist thought' (ibid., xv). We can find it in Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto, and in the writings of John Stuart Mill. Yet, I would argue, the clearest expressions of this longing for an authentic life, usually detected in the primitive uncorrupted societies of the past, is found in ideologies of nationalism.
From its origins, the search for authenticity became part and parcel of nationalist ideology, based on the notion that somewhere deep within each of us lies the preexisting self (individual or collective). Unlike many existentialists (like Heidegger and Sartre) who argue that the search for authenticity is a creative process that produces an ever-changing self, authors from the French revolution to the German Romantics, from Schopenhauer to Marx, Ibsen, Nietzsche, the psychoanalysts, and most nationalist ideologists hold 'the firmly entrenched belief that beneath the appearance of every human phenomenon there lies concealed a discrepant actuality and that intellectual, practical, and (not least) moral advantage is to be gained by forcibly bringing it to light' (Trilling 1971). What Trilling calls an 'unmasking trend', authentic by those within these nations and those outside of them has nothing to do with the fact that many of these national symbols are constructed, even invented. In order to prove the importance of historical cultural backgrounds to the process of nation-formation, ethno-symbolists, as opposed to constructivists, do not have to search for those symbols that are not invented. The power of a symbol is not derived from its origins, but from its accepted specificity and authenticity.
There are no such things as authentic nations -a nation with original, organic, unique material and textual evidence of continuity (even though these can be presented as such) -since there is no set of objective criteria for assessing authenticity. While authorship is one of the main criteria for authenticity in art, authorship of a national folksong is the sign of a fake. Hence the Ossian Scripts are Macpherson's and the Kalevala is 'ours'. Instead, there are only nations that are experienced as authentic.
Sartre believed that there is 'no entity that is an original, authentic self or ego, as Rousseau tended to believe' (Golomb 1995: 132 This brings us back to the importance of national ceremonies in the process of nationformation.
Pursuing Authenticity
Since many works on nationalism, including Mosse's, have extensively described both the texts that are performed and the characteristics of the performers, and have offered some reconstructions of their intentions, there is no need to engage in further discussion here. It suffices to say that the only intention on the part of performers that can always be assumed is their hope that the performance will have an intended effect on the audience. The performers of a national ceremony do not just hope that the targeted audience will understand and internalize the projected meaning of the act, which implies a cognitive reaction. The selection of the text performed and the whole mise-en-scène is primarily designed to provoke an emotional response from the audience. Following Alexander, I would argue that such emotional reaction will occur only when the audience perceives its experience as authentic.
Even this statement has its problems since the 'audience' might be seen as implying a fully homogenous community. As Randall Collins explains in Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) , events like festivals and ceremonies should be observed as situations.
That is, they are 'momentary encounters among human bodies charged up with give us memories around which we can reflect and negotiate our already existing sense of belonging.
Concluding remarks
As we learned from Ernest Gellner, all nations are described by their nationalist 2). Every nationalist ideology projects a picture of the 'nation's true self', whether it is labelled civic, ethnic, or anything in-between. All nationalisms, even those labelled as civic, tend to describe their authentic self as something that pre-exists the nation and has to be 'awakened'. As soon as a nation is defined in terms of any set of objective characteristics -be it language, a specific set of rights and duties, or even landscape -the prior existence of the authentic nation is assumed. That could explain why, regardless of the fact that some nations are seen as ancient and some as modern, some as organic and some as mechanical, some as reconstructed and some as invented, those that have survived have all manage to invoke passions among their members at crucial points in time. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
